Water in the Balance - A Boiling Crisis for the Nation's Water Supply

For the millions who populate the sweeping area of geography from Detroit, Michigan to Toronto, Ontario to New York, New York, the moment electrical power ceased on August 14, 2003 will not soon be forgotten. Failures in key elements of the electric grid infrastructure triggered unprecedented power outages, paralyzing large segments of population on both sides of the U.S. - Canadian border. An estimated 50 million people were suddenly without the most basic functions of daily life during what came to be known as the Northeastern Blackout of 2003.

While the blackout was largely an energy sector story highlighting the vulnerabilities of a major North American power grid, it also became a tale of crisis for the water systems in the affected areas. The interconnectedness and fragility of public service infrastructures was clear, amplifying what drinking water utilities across the country have long recognized as a significant risk to the nation. Coupled with the events of September 11, 2001, the nation's aging drinking water systems were revealed as subject to major disruption, threatening the availability of safe drinking water, the security of public waters and the delivery of vital services dependent on water supplies.

Legislation passed in 2002 requires water utilities to assess their vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks and to develop emergency response plans. These steps will help water systems respond to other types of emergencies, including blackouts. EPA established a grant program to assist utilities in conducting assessments. However, additional funds will be needed to implement the needed security upgrades. Furthermore, this much needed system overhaul will take years. Still, with water in the balance, the importance of immediate emergency water treatment responses have never been more necessary. Boil water alerts and chlorine treatments remain the most practical, viable methods of protecting water purity, preserving public health safety and providing a safe and healthy alternative water supply in crisis situations.

Troubled Waters

Among the several public health hazards that were revealed by the massive loss of power, including medical equipment malfunction, loss of air circulation and cooling functions, and impaired emergency response communications, was the central and potentially long-term effect of lost technology that governs and regulates wide-ranging portions of the public water systems.

In Cleveland, all four of the city's water pumping stations that move water uphill from Lake Erie to 1.5 million customers went down at once, leaving residents without water. Since only one station is needed to pump water to all customers, officials never anticipated that all four pumps would go down simultaneously. While Detroit's water system had backup generators in place at some water utility plants, the power generated was not enough to keep a suitable amount of pressure in the pipes, leaving 4.3 million residents of Macomb County without water service during the entirety of the blackout.

Despite the inconveniences and challenges of water service interruptions, however, are fears of a more lasting effect. Namely, disease introduction through lost water service. When power generation and distribution ceases in a blackout event, the electricity powering the pumps that push water through a city's water system can go out as well. With a resulting drop in pipe pressure, the system is open to a potential public health crisis in the form of bacteria entering the water supply. In this circumstance, drinking water can become contaminated and a normally trusted water system becomes the potential breeding ground for waterborne infection and disease.

Boiling and Chlorination Are the Best Defense

During the blackout of August 2003, water customers in Cleveland and Detroit were immediately placed under a three-day boil-water advisory. Detroit took the extra step of adding extra chlorine to its municipal water supply to combat the introduction of illness-causing bacteria. In addition, Macomb County officials ordered the area's 2,300 restaurants to shut down until the water was confirmed as not contaminated. Local water departments did not lift the boil-water alert until two water sample tests came back negative for contamination within the course of a 24-hour period.

According to the EPA, there are two essential methods to purify water for cooking and drinking depending on the circumstance. One method is boiling - the preferred method for making household water safe. Boiling water for one minute will kill any disease-causing microorganisms in the water and purify it for use as drinking or cooking water.

The second method is treating the water with chlorine. Common household bleach contains a chlorine compound that will disinfect water. The procedure to be followed is usually written on the label. When the necessary procedure is not given, however, the EPA recommends finding the percentage of available chlorine from the container label (regular household bleach is typically 5.25%, "ultra" bleach is typically 6.5%) and using the following general guide:

 

Available Chlorine	Drops per Quart of Clear Water
1%	10
4-6%	2
7-10%	1

EPA advises that the chlorine-treated water should be mixed thoroughly and allowed to stand, preferably covered, for 30 minutes. The water will have a slight chlorine odor. If not, the dosage should be repeated and the mixture allowed to stand for an additional 15 minutes. If the treated water has too strong a chlorine taste, it can be lessened by allowing the water to stand exposed to the air for a few hours or by pouring it from one clean container to another several times.

While safe and effective, chlorine treatment it generally recommended only when boiling is not a practical option.

Government Agencies Address the Issue

The immediate effects of the Northeast Blackout of 2003 on citywide and regional water systems provided a definitive window into a serious problem that federal officials had recognized since the days following September 11, 2001. Proactive protective measures were needed to shore up lagging security and infrastructure maintenance issues that weakened local, regional and national water supplies. Under authority of the Presidential Decision Directive 63 and the Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002, the EPA took on the lead role for drinking water system security, initiating a program of funding allocation and information distribution for the enhancement of water system security. EPA programming recommendations also include sourcing additional funds to support security upgrades, in addition to the current $100 million Congressional appropriation for drinking water systems vulnerability assessment and terrorist response plan development.

In October 2003, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) released a report, Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security to the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works. The report was based on a survey of 43 nationally recognized experts to ascertain how federal funding could most positively affect water system security improvement. The GAO report concluded that two major vulnerabilities exist in current water security policy.

1)	Utilities lack the necessary information to identify their most serious threats
2)	Utilities do not possess adequate back up systems. A reported lack of redundancy in the most basic public utility services leaves the normal functions of many population centers vulnerable to a single catastrophic event.

The report's majority recommendation suggested that federal grants be administered directly to the states, rather than the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund. The GAO study identified three areas where federal support is critical:

• Physical and technological upgrades
• Education and training
• Strengthen key relationships

Under the Bioterrorism Response Act, the EPA is required to order all community public water systems serving 3,300 people or more to conduct vulnerability assessments and prepare or revise an existing emergency response plan that incorporated the results of the vulnerability assessment. These required actions are designed for institution by June 30, 2004. The EPA has up to six months from the filing date of the vulnerability assessment to certify its contents.

To date, the completed vulnerability assessments have indicated that significant additional funds are necessary to support the implementation of security upgrades. Although Congress allocated more than $100 million in initial funding through fiscal year 2004, it is unlikely that these funds will do little more than help utilities plan for upgrading drinking water security. A large-scale budget will be required to implement the needed security upgrades considered essential to protect the nation's drinking water systems.

Still Unprepared

Since the GAO submitted its report to Congress in October 2003, there has been little initiative towards appropriating more money to remedy the current challenges to national drinking water systems. Both the traumatic events of terrorism that initially invigorated the process and the future water crisis that the 2003 Northeast Blackout revealed on the national stage have lost a good deal of their momentum to motivate water security issues as a public issue of interest.

However, as the Northeast Blackout proved, events will not wait for decisions to be made. As we learned, an unanticipated event such as those of August 2003 can jeopardize the safety of the public water supply in an instant, and tilt life's ordinary activities toward circumstances the nation is not yet prepared to address or handle.